Saturday, May 31, 2008
'On the Wrong Track' - A summary of RailCorp Corruption
1. Operation Monto - a summary of the most recent ICAC investigation into RailCorp corruption, written by Matthew Jones.
2. RailCorp Structural Danger - a summary of the investigation into structural instabilities at a number of rail stations, and the FOI battle fought by the Sydney Morning Herald to gain documents from RailCorp. Written by Mary Prince.
3. ICAC vs. Railcorp Maintenance - an examination of the 2006 ICAC investigation into corruption in relation to external contractors at RailCorp. Written by Aaron Hobbs.
4. The State Rail Authority - A look at RailCorp's corrupt past, and the prior investigations undertaken by ICAC. Written by André Szczepanski.
Friday, May 30, 2008
Operation Monto - Summary
Operation Monto is a current ICAC investigation into RailCorp, a company which according to IBISWorld Industry Market Research had some 13,805 employees at the end of 2007. The investigation is centered around claims that more than 20 current and ex-RailCorp employees working within the Asset Management Group acted fraudulently and/or accepted bribes in relation to goods and services contracts, for example the supply of wiring components or cleaning services. According to the initial allegations, the employees cost RailCorp over $6 million in corrupt payments and contracts – this figure has since been revised to at least $19 million. The public inquiry phase of the ICAC investigation began on November 19, 2007 and hearings concluded on May 23, 2008, with findings and recommendations yet to be released.
Who Broke the Story?
It seems that in this case, the media learned of the story only when the ICAC public inquiry began. Although the Herald did publish a story on the issue, as detailed below, this occurred well after the beginning of the ICAC investigation, and after the start of the Operation Monto public inquiry. Attempts to contact Linton Besser about his investigation were ultimately unsuccessful.
What were the ramifications of the story?
As the story is ongoing, it is difficult to say what ramifications it will have. Given that few, if any of the recommendations made by the last ICAC investigation in RailCorp were adopted, it is not unreasonable to assume that little will change after the findings of Operation Monto are released. ICAC assisting Counsel Ms Chris Ronalds SC has stated during the public inquiry that she will seek criminal charges against the RailCorp employees involved.
Who was involved in the case?
Key figures in the case:
Mr Jerrold Cripps - ICAC commissioner.
Ms Chris Ronalds SC - ICAC assisting Counsel.
Mr Gary Seabury - Head of RailCorp asset management.
Mr George Laidlaw - RailCorp track operations supervisor.
Ms Renea Hughes - former RailCorp plant hire purchasing officer.
Mr Brett Schleibs - former RailCorp staff member.
Mr Michael Blackstock - RailCorp staff member currently on suspension.
Allan Maxwell Walker - current RailCorp staff member.
Ivan Stanic - current RailCorp employee.
Numerous other RailCorp employees were brought before the ICAC inquiry for involvement in corrupt activities, however the above employees can be considered the ‘ringleaders’ of the majority of the schemes uncovered by ICAC.
Ethical and legal dilemma’s involved in the investigation
In terms of ethical and legal issues, this case was disappointingly straightforward. While one could question the ethical implications of the ICAC surveillance of RailCorp workers, the material uncovered more than justifies intruding on the workers privacy. Legally, the ICAC was well within its powers throughout the entire investigation and public inquiry.
Use of external bodies i.e regulators in bringing this matter to the attention of the public
As mentioned earlier, this story in fact came about entirely because of the Independent Commission Against Corruption, or ICAC. However, further details about corruption within the Asset Management Group were brought to light by the Herald’s Linton Besser in late 2007 – this story was not connected to Operation Monto.
RailCorp Structural Danger - Summary
• Facts of the case
RailCorp knew from some time around 2003 (possibly earlier) that some of the buildings over the tracks were in disrepair, and could pose a risk to the public in the event of a train derailment. The main buildings of concern were the Hurstville Super Centre, Goulbourn Street Parking Station, and the Cahill Expressway over Circular Quay.
The Sydney Morning Herald, lead mainly by Anne Davies and Michael Moore, began investigating the case in 2004. They made two separate requests in 2004 and 2005 for the information from RailCorp. In late 2004 they obtained a report from RailCorp, which stated that there were faults in some buildings - however in the report, these were only estimations and did not go into specific detail as to what buildings were at risk, and how severe the situation was.
In 2007, Michael Moore campaigned for further details under FOI. After RailCorp refused to give him more information, he took his request to the NSW Ombudsman, who in turn put pressure on RailCorp to release the information. The battle became very much public, with Moore writing several pieces in the Herald about the abuse of FOI by RailCorp. Finally, in March 2007, they recieved enough information from RailCorp to piece together the full picture. More than 60 sites along the CityRail network were in disrepair, some enough to be labelled a serious threat to commuters travelling along the network.
• Who broke the story
Michael Moore and Anne Davies.
• What were the ramifications of the story
RailCorp were discredited by the story, as their refusal to cooperate with the journalists meant that they lost their transparency. Among so many other scandals, the findings of structural faults simply added to the air of secrecy surrounding the organisation.
As a result of the investigation, and the ensuing public panic, RailCorp took steps to ensure the safety of passengers. These included installing extra guardrails along the tracks to prevent derailment, replacement of eroded concrete supports, and steel reinforcement in some buildings. Some buildings were knocked down, however this was unrelated to the Herald investigation.
• Who was involved in the case
RailCorp Chief Executive Vince Graham (moved to Integral Energy)
2007 Minister for Transport John Watkins
• How did the journalist research the information to write the story
A lot of the information obtained by Moore and Davies was from the FOI requests. They also conducted their own research, through photographing the sites along the network and assessing the danger themselves.
• Ethical and legal dilemma’s involved in the investigation
There is the ethical dilemma of creating public panic, however, as none of the buildings were in critical disrepair, this would be unlikely. As RailCorp is meant to be held accountable by the public, there should be no legal issues in trying to obtain information from them and publishing critisms of the CityRail network.
• Use of external bodies i.e regulators in bringing this matter to the attention of the public
NSW Ombudsman. This was more of a last resort. Moore explored the issue in depth again in March 2008, when RailCorp continued to refuse the information.
Monday, May 26, 2008
Operation Monto - Who started it all?
Herald story - 'Rorts central at RailCorp'
http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/railcorp-rorts-central/2007/12/20/1197740472466.html
Saturday, May 24, 2008
RailCorp Structural Danger - Revisiting the airspace
Hurstville Station/Super Centre
This is a part of what SMH outlined in the problem - these supports are all that's holding up thousands of tonnes of concrete above the station. If you look closely you can see the guardrails that were installed to help prevent a derailment.
At the moment, RailCorp (in conjunction with the business owners in the Super Centre) are refurbishing the building, as well as adding extra steel supports throughout the building.
The big cream thing there is one of the new steel braces that's been built in. This photo is a little blurry, I didn't realise at the time.
Here you can see the scaffolding they've got in place while the refurbishment is being completed.
Circular Quay/Cahill Expressway Flyover
Here's the view of the station from underneath. As with Hurstville, you can see the guardrails running just beside the platform.
This is the expressway as viewed from outside the station. The layers of concrete that you can see near the top there were the main concern - many of these were replaced.
The Cahill Expressway above the station. If a train had derailed, the whole thing would've collapsed in this spot - taking everything with it.
Goulbourn Street Parking Station
This was interesting, as from what I could see, the parking station still looked incredibly delapitated.
This is the building viewed from the outside. Trains pass underneath it. As you can see, those concrete pillars do not look entirely strong.
Concrete barriers outside the building. These aren't to prevent trains from damaging the building, but rather, cars. If a building is so delicate that a car would damage it, what would a train do?
I managed to take peek through the wall to the space underneath. It appears to be a similar kind of situation as with Hurstville and Circular Quay - those pillars are the only things holding the weight of the building. From the disrepair of the rest of the concrete, I wouldn't be surprised if those are in the same condition.
I'm not sure that the Herald had victory with Goulbourn Street, however the other two sites I looked at seemed to have everything more or less under control.
Friday, May 23, 2008
Operation Monto - 7:30 Report Summary
Operation Monto - When did it all start?
Contacting ICAC directly via their media officer Nicole Thomas was no help - all she could tell me was that ICAC doesn't reveal details of their investigations, which I suppose is to be expected given that it's an ongoing case.
Digging a bit further (via the ever helpful Factiva) uncovered a couple of Herald stories, including this one:
Police investigate RailCorp's $500,000 con woman case
BY MATTHEW BENNS AND EAMONN DUFF
17 December 2006
Sun Herald
A CONVICTED con woman who was given a top job in RailCorp is being investigated for embezzling about $500,000 from her employer.
Renea Hughes even hired a Hertz rental car when she was head of RailCorp's plant hire section and allegedly tricked her bosses into footing the bill.
Six years ago Hughes was sentenced to six months of weekend detention for defrauding Centrelink of a large sum of money.
Questions have been asked in NSW Parliament about how much she embezzled from Railcorp. It has been confirmed police have been notified and the matter is being investigated by the Independent Commission Against Corruption.
A separate police investigation is looking into a missing $20,000 from Hughes's son's junior football club.
The Sun-Herald understands an internal RailCorp investigation found Hughes had set up a complicated contractor payment system that resulted in $5000 in Railcorp money being paid to her each month. A RailCorp source, who refused to be named, said: "What is alarming is that this is taxpayers' money and that there were no proper procedures in place to check on her placing orders and then authorising these payments," he said.
The dodgy payments did not come to light until after the 37-year-old resigned in May. Her replacement discovered the payments for the Hertz hire car.
A RailCorp spokeswoman said: "As part of our own internal processes RailCorp identified a potential issue and referred the matter to NSW Police and ICAC is investigating."
Hughes could not be contacted at her home in western Sydney yesterday.
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Interestingly, there's no record of any investigation relating to Renea Hughes until November of 2007, when the Operation Monto public inquiry began. Although ICAC won’t confirm or deny, I believe that the Hughes investigation, probably combined with the findings of the air-con corruption investigation, led to the beginning of the Monto investigation.
Update: Looking a little more closely at the 7:30 Report video revealed that surveillance was underway at least as early as June 14, 2006 – this surveillance was quite possibly part of the air-con corruption investigation, and later branched off into Operation Monto; of course, ICAC won’t confirm or deny anything.
Update 2: Records of the Legislative Council show that questions were asked about Renea Hughe’s in November 2006.
http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/PARLMENT/Committee.nsf/0/0f93b119e2ec657bca2571f4000c5af0/$FILE/Transport%20QoN%206%20Nov%20-%20Trains.pdf
Update 3: Transcripts from the ICAC on May 22 show that a report existed in early to mid 2005 detailing an investigation into George Laidlaw which showed clearly his corrupt behaviour.
Thursday, May 22, 2008
Operation Monto - The Key Figures
Ms Chris Ronalds SC - ICAC assisting Counsel.
Mr Gary Seabury - Head of RailCorp asset management.
Mr George Laidlaw - RailCorp track operations supervisor. Alleged to have conspired with Mr Schleibs to award RailCorp work to a select group of external contractors in return for financial rewards.
Ms Renea Hughes - former RailCorp plant hire purchasing officer. ICAC alleges that she:
• "instigated three separate fraudulent schemes that in conjunction with William Kuipers she created false records in order to defraud RailCorp of an excess of $500,000, and that Mr Kuipers paid her $5000 a week for a period of over 18 months with no basis."
• "defrauded RailCorp of in excess of $100,000 through the submission of false invoices leading to overpayments for work never performed over a period of 20 months."
• "manipulated RailCorp records to fraudulently facilitate payments of over $30,000 for use of a hire car over a period of 20 months."
Mr Brett Schleibs - former RailCorp staff member. Alleged to have conspired with Mr Laidlaw to award RailCorp work to a select group of external contractors in return for financial rewards.
Mr Michael Blackstock - RailCorp staff member currently on suspension. Alleged to "have engaged in corrupt conduct in relation to the provision of services to RailCorp." Corrupt conduct included "favouritism and bias in the allocation of work, and substantial false and padded invoices."
Allan Maxwell Walker - current RailCorp staff member. Alleged that he "engaged in corrupt practices by defrauding RailCorp in relation to services claimed to have been provided by external contractors" Corrupt conduct includes the "payment of substantial secret commissions to Mr Walker over a lengthy period."
Ivan Stanic - current RailCorp employee. Alleged that he has "received a reward from companies...in return for using his position at RailCorp to award RailCorp work to these companies." Corrupt conduct includes the "payment of substantial secret commissions to Mr Stanic over a lengthy period."
Tuesday, May 20, 2008
RailCorp Structural Danger - Interview with an architect
So what was wrong with that car park? Or, what is wrong with it.
Well, I don’t really know what was wrong with it. They determined that if a train derailed underneath it, the whole thing would fall down, pretty much. But I think they might’ve corrected that now, placed a whole lot of concrete barriers and all that sort of stuff up to protect the structure above.
Is there anywhere else that you think could be structurally faulty? You mentioned Kogarah..
Kogarah has a similar problem, but it’s protected by platforms. You never know.
What about Hurstville with the Super Centre above it?
That’s the same as Kogarah. Kogarah and Hurstville are the same.
How dangerous is that? If a train was to derail before they had done all those upgrades…
Well, they didn’t really upgrade Kogarah. Although they are starting to do some areas of Hurstville, I think. There’s some isolated structures outside, beyond the platform.
With the Goulbourn St Carpark, before they did the upgrades on it, if a train had derailed under there, what impact would that have on the building?
I don’t know how tall it was, I think it was a five or six storey carpark. Because of the type of structure it was, which was mainly precast concrete, the whole thing would’ve come down. It’s only a carpark.
Safety inspections – is that something they’d have to do every year? Whose responsibility is that?
The people that build over the top of railway infrastructure usually have air rights leases. I don’t know whose responsibility it is, whether it’s the responsibility of the people who own the air rights, over the top of the railways, or whether it’s the railways themselves. It’s very complicated.
What about the Cahill Expressway above Circular Quay?
That had a lot of concern around it because of structural defects. Concrete cancer, they called it. The Cahill Expressway was built under Bradfield, that’s why they called it the Bradfield Highway, and he designed the underground – what do you call it – the city loop, like Town Hall, Museum, and all those stations around there. From Wynyard to Museum and Central, he designed that railway city loop, and that was part of his thing. But that got under scrutiny because of concrete cancer, exfoliation or erosion of protective materials, and things like that one the steelwork.
How old are those structures?
I’m not sure exactly. The Goulbourn Street Parking Station was part of those developments too. It goes back a long time. I mean, Bradfield was responsible for the Harbour Bridge, as well. Early 1900’s. That was a part of his whole job. But! It’s a long time, and the maintenance to keep it all going is hard to maintain. And what with the technology these days, what we know these days, compared to what we knew back then – you can imagine the difference. We didn’t have TV!
They did build it, to an extent, with expansion in mind, but did they build it thinking it would last another hundred years?
I think they built it thinking that it would last forever. But I don’t think, knowing what we know now, they had the resources and information to make it last forever. You could do something now to make it last forever, what with all of the advancements we’ve had in technology. But back then, they were pioneers.
Monday, May 19, 2008
The State Rail Authority, Part II - The Culmination
It turned out that corruption was much more serious than was first imagined with Trackfast. The SRA had been the subject of the two hearings in 1992 and 1993 concerning Trackfast. However, they had also been the subject of ten other major investigations, as well as over 240 complaints of corruption. The ICAC found that "those investigations and analyses of the complaints received indicated that corruption in the SRA was ingrained, serious and widespread".
From the ICAC website, on a corruption report concerning the SRA:
What is revealed in the report is only a sample of what was occurring. While the losses to the revenue of the State from the conduct examined in this report are considerable, they are only a very small fraction of that were occurring across the whole of the former SRA.This chilling note points at corruption on a massive scale, in many parts of the SRA. The report from the ICAC pointed out "four occurrences of serious corruption in the former SRA". Each case study showed examples of serious wastage of public funds and other effects of corrupt conduct. Three of the case studies are detailed below.
Case Study 1 - Payments and prostitutes
The first case study exposed theft of public resources (mostly rail track and other rail components), which were worth between $250 000 and $500 000. The theft was made by the senior site manager the North Strathfield SRA office, Philip Alan Christopher. He then sold the equipment to a railway construction and maintenance company, Monotral. Another company, Structrite Pty. Ltd., was involved in the payments for the equipment. Findings of corrupt conduct were made against Christopher, as well as George Zuev of Structrite, and John Roberts of Monotral.
From the ICAC report:
Other poor practices revealed in the letting of these contracts were contract splitting and the booking of work to a contract that had nothing to do with the work.Case Study 2 - Balls and boats
Medical certificates, specifying results of vision and hearing tests, were mandatory for those working in the vicinity of railway lines. Zuev forged medical certificates, adversely affecting SRA safety requirements.
Zuev supplied a range of benefits to Christopher and other SRA staff. He performed the role of builder, free of charge for a substantial renovation and extension to Christopher's house; work which would ordinarily have cost Christopher about $80,000. In addition Zuev, with the assistance of Christopher, compromised SRA officers subordinate to Christopher by providing those officers with meals, accommodation and the services of prostitutes.
This case study illustrates gross abuse of overtime, as well as bribery and favouritism in the SRA. John Thomas Swann, the former District Structures Manager for the Illawarra Line, did plenty of things that were clearly a waste of taxpayer money, and a gross misuse of power.
Swann:
- claimed overtime for himself during weekends and at night, when he wasn't actually at work.
- claimed he was working, when he was actually playing golf.
- encouraged his team to falsify overtime records. It was found that only 40-50% of overtime claimed was actually worked.
- authorised overtime for an employee in order to clear a debt he owed the employee. The employee did not work the hours clocked.
- authorised overtime for an employee, when the employee was actually working on Swann's boat.
- received payments from contractors in return for granting contracts to them.
Such behaviour not only wastes public money, but gives rise to the further concern that the work, which Swann was paid to supervise, may not have been performed to a satisfactory standard in the absence of his supervision. The contractors chosen may neither have been the best available nor may their fees (prior to the overcharging to finance the bribes) have been an efficient use of public money.Case Study 3 - Brooms and boons
Like many other instances of corrupt conduct in the SRA, this case study details the investigation of two employees who started their own train cleaning business, then awarded contracts to said business. This corruption was made possible when the SRA made an attempt to reduce permanent staff, and instead use contract cleaners.
The ICAC gave the following reasons for the corruption:
Due to industrial unrest, the SRA decided that the contract cleaners were to be employed only on a day-to-day `trial' basis. No tenders were called for the work and no term contracts were entered into at that time. As a result, SRA procedures for the procurement of contract cleaning services were not adequately monitored, and supervisors in the position of Fleet Presentation Managers engaged contract cleaners as they saw fit without proper accountability. This was an opportunity for corrupt profit that was seized upon by two SRA officers, Damon Schreiber and John Pett, who were then Fleet Presentation Managers with responsibility for the SRA's Prince Alfred siding, and the Illawarra line and Mortdale yards respectively. Their scheme involved giving SRA cleaning work to their company, Pamlan Pty Ltd (Pamlan). They had no documented connection with Pamlan which was ostensibly owned and controlled by a trusted associate, Laurence Brown (who was not and had never been an employee of the SRA). This scheme provided Pamlan with some $4 million in income, and each of them with commensurate cash and assets. The SRA was Pamlan's sole source of income.A side effect of this corruption was that the work performed by such contractors was said to be satisfactory, when it was nothing of the sort. In one instance, Colin Malcolm Williams had been hired to inspect 150 train carriages after they had been cleaned. Williams testified that he had been bribed, and said bribes influenced him to report the carriages as clean. In reality, the carriages were not up to specification. Public money had again been wasted, as services which had been paid for were not actually rendered.
The State Rail Authority - a cesspool of corruption
Reading the report, it's incredible that there was so much corruption within so many different branches of an organisation. The investigation reveals not only instances of corruption, but a whole culture. As is shown in the other posts, people in the SRA just didn't learn their lesson the first time round. RailCorp is still a cesspool of corruption.
Operation Monto – The Details
Sunday, May 18, 2008
The State Rail Authority, Part I - On the Fast Track to Destruction
The SRA had a small division named Trackfast, responsible for parcels and small freight to about 300 country towns. In 1989, Gary Camp was appointed to the position of General Manager, and inherited a management team. Camp also inherited an incredibly fragmented organisation, that had many independently operating sections.
Camp understood that the organisation had to undergo major changes. The organisation had previously rendered services, but had not recorded a profit, and had no plans to do so. In the years of 1986-87, the Trackfast recorded losses of $42.4 million dollars. By 1989, it had projected losses of $32.1 million. Camp had been appointed turn Trackfast into a profit oriented organisation.
Camp came up with a plan to make Trackfast profitable. To cut a long story short, Camp had not acted dishonestly by the end of the whole thing. The person who was at fault was Tony Wilson, who had acted corruptly.
Wilson had offered contracts to a company called Extran. The contracts were worth in excess of $3.6 million. Extran overcharged Trackfast by over $170 000, with the approval of Tony Wilson. It was found that Gary Camp had unknowingly assisted Tony Wilson, as Wilson had misled Camp. Wilson was the only person found to have acted corruptly.
It should be noted, however, that Camp managed to change losses $42 million to a projected profit of $3.4 million.
From the Sydney Morning Herald, on the 29th of September, 1992:
Corruption in State Rail's freight business, Trackfast, had occurred after the NSW Government had put too much pressure on management to return a profit, the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) found yesterday.
The ICAC assistant commissioner, Mr Ronald Sackville, QC, also severely criticised Trackfast for management failures in his report on corruption in the organisation.
Mr Sackville found that the former fleet manager of Trackfast, Mr Tony Wilson, had acted corruptly and should be sacked for secretly assisting a tenderer to obtain valuable contracts from State Rail.
He also found that the former Trackfast general manager, Mr Gary Camp, was not corrupt but should be sacked for unwittingly helping Mr Wilson.
State Rail dismissed both employees last January and cancelled its contract with Extran, the company Mr Wilson had favoured to win business worth $3.6 million.
Mr Sackville said that it was important for State Rail and other public organisations not to dismiss this incident in Trackfast's history as simply a case of wrongdoing, compounded by the ineptitude by the general manager.
"These elements comprise only part of the story," he said.
Mr Sackville said that corruption did not occur in a vacuum and indicated that a decision to restructure Trackfast in 1989 to achieve full cost recovery in two years was relevant to his inquiry.
The financial performance of Trackfast had improved from a disastrous base, although profitability was never achieved, he said.
"What is striking, however, is how little appears to have been done specifically to train and support those charged with responsibility for fundamentally restructuring Trackfast," he said.
"... The staff considered themselves to be under very considerable pressure to achieve swift results in an uncertain environment, on the pain of closure of the enterprise should the endeavour fail."
According to Mr Sackville's report, Mr Wilson provided improper support to Mr Stuart Taylor and Mr Malcolm Chapman, the principals of Extran, in the drafting of tenders for two significant contracts - the metropolitan door-to-door contract and delivery of freight to the NSW South Coast.
A spokesman for the Minister for Transport, Mr Baird, said yesterday that the minister accepted Mr Sackville's opinion that tough goals had been set for Trackfast in an attempt to cut public costs.
But he defended the performance of Trackfast, saying that it had gone from a loss of $40 million a year to a projected profit of $3.4 million this year.
"We are not making an apology for setting tough standards," the spokesman said. "But we are not excusing misconduct either."
The spokesman said that, in hindsight, Mr Baird could see that tighter controls could have been put in place at Trackfast - and State Rail had now addressed these problems.
The chief executive of State Rail, Mr Ross Sayers, defended the record of State Rail, saying that tough goals had been set across the organisation.
"The tough standards were no excuse for the conduct of certain employees which has been detailed by Mr Sackville in his report," he said.
Mr Sackville has also conducted hearings into State Rail's hire of earthmoving equipment in the north of the State and is due to issue a report later this year.
ICAC vs. Railcorp Maintenance Engineer, aka How to subvert your employer and satisfy your greed.
Saturday, May 17, 2008
RailCorp Structural Danger - Timeline
Timeline and events
2003
RailCorp and City of Sydney Council launched a commission into the safety of Goulbourn Street Parking Station, located above the tracks between Central and Town Hall. After deciding the building did not quite meet safety standards, they proceeded to make plans to upgrade the facility.
http://209.85.173.104/search?q=cache:Lp1ib_02GoQJ:www.cityofsydney.nsw.gov.au/
council/documents/meetings/2007/Committee/Finance/200807/070820_FPTC_ITEM04.pdf
+railcorp+goulbourn+street+station&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=au
4th December 2004
Under FOI, SMH obtained details that structures and multi-storey buildings built over railway tracks could be unsafe.
As Sydney grapples with how to accommodate its future population, a report to
RailCorp has warned that building residential apartments over railway lines
is "inherently problematic", could pose safety risks and inhibit growth of
the rail network.
The report, obtained by the Herald under freedom of information legislation, warns that the 40-year-old Hurstville Super Centre, which straddles the tracks, is an example of the problems that could be faced in the future. It says the centre is rundown and does not meet modern safety standards.
"The Hurstville Super Centre does not meet Railcorp standards in a number of respects, including support piers, transfer beams, clearance, centre-line clearance, column and pier stability, structural integrity, vibration and noise isolation and fire life safety," the report, by independent consultant Arnold Dix, says.”
The article, which was only several hundred words in length, only gives specific detail about the Hurstville Super Centre. Other unsafe sites were not listed by RailCorp, as SMH did not have the whole range of documents that they had requested. The reason given, as was outlined later on in the case, was public safety.
http://www.smh.com.au/news/National/Safety-risk-stops-railapartments/2004/12/03/1101923341785.html
25 March, 2006.
SMH launches an investigation into the Goulbourn Street Parking Station. The information they have been able to gain is quite patchy in places, as by this stage they had received limited official
information from RailCorp. Moore quotes a source used by the Telegraph. Very interesting in terms of Freedom Of Information - he speaks in the last couple of paragraphs about the information they HAD obtained from RailCorp - most of the articles they received were blacked-out for the majority of the document. I’ve included the entire article as it’s quite a good read.
(I found the whole article compiled by a blogger named Marvin on the railpage website. http://www.railpage.com.au/f-t11315948.htm. Thanks Marv!)
August 2006Car park danger: if it's been fixed, tell us
By Matthew Moore
FOI Editor
March 25, 2006
FOR nearly three years the city's Goulburn Street car park has resembled a US Government installation at risk of a terrorist attack. Concrete barriers keep vehicles clear of two perimeter walls and wire fencing keeps people away. Scaffolding prevents concrete panels toppling into the streets below, and rows of heavy steel supports prop up the concrete slabs that divide each floor.
Tens of thousands of people a day travel in trains that run under the building, but the Government says it's not in the public interest to let them see the publicly funded reports that say whether the building is at risk of collapse, and what steps have been taken to make it safe.
The Herald applied to RailCorp last year under Freedom of Information laws for documents describing the problem, the recommended solutions and associated correspondence. We sought technical reports on the structural integrity of the car park and the Supa Centre at Hurstville, which sits over the Illawarra railway line, both of which have been identified by RailCorp as being at risk of collapse if a derailed train were to hit supporting piers. After eight months of deliberation, RailCorp has decided to keep secret virtually all reports and correspondence about the car park, which is owned by the City of Sydney. It has done so even though the corporation's freedom of information officer, Nathan Cureton, says "the projects to which the documents relate are essentially complete".
Although RailCorp says it has undertaken "relevant upgrading" of the car park and the Supa Centre, it won't release the documents on the grounds that "to an uninformed person this material does not indicate that the work has been carried out …" RailCorp has used a barrage of arguments to hide the facts. It relies heavily on one which says it could suffer financially if the public read the expert material. "Given that the rail network is a business catering for millions of customers, its success is contingent on those customers having confidence in it and using it … A lack of consumer confidence in, for example, the safety of the rail system will result in less customers and, as a result, a major loss of revenue to this agency." Mr Cureton says passengers deserting RailCorp would trigger a wider problem for NSW. "… as customers seek alternative means of transport the state will be substantially adversely affected as well", he wrote in a 10-page letter. Experience makes these claims seem dubious.
In mid-2003 The Daily Telegraph published several stories quoting an expert report which said the columns supporting the Goulburn Street car park had only 10 to 20 per cent of the strength needed to stop the building collapsing in a train derailment. No boycott of the rail system followed. At the same time, the then head of State Rail and the current head of RailCorp, Vince Graham, included the Goulburn Street car park in a list of six sites he identified as being at high risk of collapse in the event of train derailments. Other sites on the list included the Hurstville Supa Centre, a car park at Marrickville, a shopping centre at North Sydney and structures at Bankstown and Central stations.
Increased threat of a terrorist attack was another reason RailCorp cited to withhold all parts of a risk management study, a crash-barrier assessment of the car park. Because such documents include plans and loading capacities, RailCorp claims their release could "undermine the structural integrity" of the building, even though sensitive details could easily be withheld. The only documents released were 30 pages of minutes of meetings, but every page was blanked out completely or left with a few meaningless words.
It took RailCorp 140 hours to gather the reports and decide to exempt virtually everything. It estimated the cost of doing this at $4200 but, because it was months late replying to the request, it cut the cost of providing no information to $360.
The Herald is appealing.
RailCorp and City of Sydney Council make plans on the upgrade of Goulbourn Street Parking Station. In August 2007, City of Sydney Council released a financial report, outlining:
A report on the condition of the parking station was presented to Council in August 2006 setting out essential maintenance works in progress and providing a range of options for the future of the Parking Station.
As a consequence, a study of future use options for the Parking Station was undertaken. The study concluded that major redevelopment of the property for other use(s) was not viable in the short to medium term and that, as a necessary and interim measure, the building should be upgraded in line with the technical reports prepared by consultants.
The purposes of the approach now proposed are:
(a) to improve the visual amenity of the Parking Station;
(b) ensure continuity of revenue; and
(c) maintain safe operation.
A recent meeting with the Chief Executive Officer of RailCorp confirmed, in principle, agreement with that approach.
http://www.cityofsydney.nsw.gov.au/council/documents/meetings/2007/Committee/Finance/200807/070820_FPTC_ITEM04.pdf
21st March 2007
AM
SMH, after finally recieving documents from RailCorp (after a two year battle), releases details that the organisation has covered up five possible areas of danger to the public. SMH obtained information about unsafe structures built above tracks at five sites along the cityrail network. These include the Hurstville Super Centre (above Hurstville Station), Goulbourn Street Parking Station (in between Central and Town Hall stations), the Cahill Expressway (above Circular Quay), a rail structure built above Central Station, and North Sydney station.
The article states that a derailment at Hurstville Station, located underneath the Super Centre, would result in a disaster similar to that of the Granville train accident in 1977, where the deaths of 83 people could be linked to a faulty structure above the railine.
Michael Moore again stresses the battle the paper had with RailCorp, saying that "piecing together the risks involved and what has been done to these structures is difficult because RailCorp heavily censored the documents provided under the FoI request."
http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/coverup-rail-crash-risks-compared-to-granville/2007/03/20/1174153066795.html
PM
Railcorp releases a statement of defence on their website, and Chief Executive Officer, Vince Graham fronts the press. They state reasons for public safety for not releasing the report earlier.
Mr Graham said that RailCorp had provided most of the documents that related to the structures, to the applicant… In the interests of protecting the security of the structures, some of the details in these documents were not released. Following a review which was requested by the NSW Ombudsman, RailCorp maintained its position that releasing these documents would compromise the security of the structures. This decision was based on the fact that the remaining documents contained detailed information about the structures that if made public would pose a security risk. RailCorp stands by its decision not to release information that amounts to a ‘how to’ manual for individuals wanting to destroy a structure in a high density areas and pose serious danger to passengers and staff.
http://www.cityrail.info/news/070321-structures.jsp
Present
Since the information has been released, RailCorp has kept a track on their website of the upgrades they’ve undertaken, and no doubt Moore had as well. The Goulbourn Street Parking Station still looks a little uncertain.

I'm planning on going to a few of the sites to see whether there has been any obvious developments. I think it is a fair call to say that, as a result of the pressure that SMH put on RailCorp, these places will be a lot safer. Hopefully this will also lead RailCorp to be a little more transparent in the future.

